In this thesis, I investigate realist, anti-realist and pluralist views in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of complexity. The philosophy of science can inform the philosophy of complexity and vice versa because we can consider scientific inquiry to largely involve the study of complex systems. I however find that the relevant realist, anti-realist and pluralist views are problematic in various ways, and that a version of pragmatism suggests a promising alternative. This version of pragmatism incorporates elements of pluralism, (...) but maintains a commitment to epistemic hierarchy, convergence and progress. The way to develop such a version of pragmatism is, I argue, by rebooting William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science. Whewell however held to the following two transcendental claims: 1. Empirical inquiry undertaken in science properly practiced can reveal necessary truths. 2. The revelation of such necessary truths grants us a glimpse of the mind of God. Such transcendental claims are obviously at odds with pragmatism. There are however core features of Whewell’s view that are notably pragmatist in nature, features that explicitly inspired Charles Sanders Piece’s convergent pragmatism. These are as follows: 3. Subject and object (or mind and world) are inextricably entwined during scientific inquiry; they are not separated by anything like a correspondence relationship. 4. Science progresses via what Whewell calls the consilience of inductions (an ongoing merging of scientific theories, a merging that increases our understanding of the world over time). I modify Whewell’s view by stripping away its transcendental elements while maintaining its pragmatist elements. What remains is, I argue, a robust and novel kind of pragmatism suitable for being introduced into the contemporary philosophy of science. Whewell suitably-pragmatised can offer new insights into ongoing debates, particularly those around the nature of scientific progress, scientific truth and scientific understanding. (shrink)

We are extremely grateful for the insightful and thought-provoking commentaries on our feature article.1 We have distilled four themes emerging from the commentaries, and we would also like to address one misunderstanding of our argument that has appeared. In our article, we explicitly acknowledge that major decisions relevant for climate protection take place at the mesolevels and macrolevels of healthcare, a point raised again in some of the commentaries.2–4 Climate protection is a societal issue, and we thank these authors for (...) the concrete proposals of potential models to guide action. Yet, to us, it still makes sense to reflect simultaneously on the responsibilities that physicians have themselves. Without wanting to put the main responsibility on them, we argue it is important to start thinking about the scope of action that physicians actually have (or not have). As we have argued the need for climate action comes ever more into focus of society, we wanted to explore whether the professional ethics of the medical professionals needs to be amended. Our argument is that this is the case, based on the reasons that climate change has a big health impact while simultaneously the health system has a strong climate impact. Based on the World Medical Association (WMA) Declaration of Geneva the focus on the individual patient is clear, but this and other important codices do also include a public health perspective. The (model) Professional Code for Physicians in Germany, for example, states in its first article that ‘Physicians serve the health of …. (shrink)

The idea that the state ought to be neutral towards different conceptions of the good life has been an influential principle in liberal theory since the 1970s. It has, however, been subject to criticism by communitarians, multiculturalists and liberal perfectionists. Recently, Peter Balint has attempted to defend state neutrality against its liberal critics as the adequate interpretation of the liberal project by redefining it as a range concept. By arguing that neutrality always occurs within a specific range of permissible conceptions (...) of the good life, Balint provides a convincing rebuttal of neutrality’s critics. In this paper I argue that while neutrality as a range concept provides an adequate account of state neutrality, it also makes it vulnerable to a new line of critique. Since the range of neutrality cannot be deduced from the principle of neutrality itself, neutrality is subject to political developments beyond its own control. I will start by clarifying the notion of neutrality as a range concept. Secondly, I will demonstrate that Balint’s notion of the range concept finds ample support in the wider literature on neutrality. Thirdly, I will argue that, as a range concept, neutrality ultimately depends on politically constituted value judgments. (shrink)

In vice epistemology, bad epistemic outcomes, such as maintaining false beliefs, are interpreted as indicators of blameworthy irrationality. Conversely, a growing trend in philosophical psychology advocates for environmentalist explanations, suggesting these outcomes emerge because rational cognitive processes of faultless individuals falter due to polluted environmental inputs. Building on concrete examples, I first offer a systematic analysis of the relative explanatory merits of that environmentalist project. I then use this analysis to advance the rationality debate, which has recently been identified as (...) stagnating due to an observational equivalence between environmentalist and vice accounts. Although the conceptual imprecision of vice epistemology has frequently been critiqued, the framework developed here reveals that environmentalism is (also) unable to meet various theoretical desiderata. I show why this is so and argue that, to make progress, environmentalism needs a more substantive conception of epistemic rationality. To this end, I propose that a closer engagement with questions of cognitive agency – how rational creatures can “make up” their minds about what to believe – could enable the necessary progress. (shrink)

Dans sa violente charge contre la Révolution française, Edmund Burke avait élevé le débat politique à un niveau philosophique. Son argument le plus profond consistait à reprocher aux révolutionnaires de pécher par apriorisme, en cherchant à déduire, comme des géomètres, une nouvelle constitution à partir des principes abstraits énoncés dans la Déclaration des droits de l’homme. Reprise par les disciples allemands de Burke, cette critique de la méthode adoptée par la Constituante tirait des postulats empiristes des Lumières anglo-écossaises toutes les (...) implications conservatrices que recelaient déjà les textes politiques et historiques de Hume. Or c’est d’emblée sur ce terrain spéculatif que se joue, chez Fichte, la défense du droit de révolution. Reprochant à l’empirisme de réduire l’esprit au « mécanisme aveugle de l’association des idées », passivement déterminé par une extériorité en soi, Fichte entend au contraire fonder l’expérience elle-même sur l’activité d’un « Moi-en-soi », absolument indépendant. Conçu comme causalité libre, pouvant donc s’affranchir des « conjonctions coutumières » humiennes pour commencer une nouvelle série dans l’ordre des phénomènes, l’homme, pour Fichte, n’a pas seulement la « faculté de se perfectionner », mais la loi de sa liberté lui en fait même un devoir. Au regard de cet impératif catégorique de perfectionnement, il n’y a pas de Common Law qui tienne. Aussi Fichte ne recule-t-il pas devant la révolution, si les institutions du passé font obstacle à la destination de l’homme. (shrink)

Sidonius Apollinaris’ Epist. 3.12 tells how one day, while leaving Lyons, he caught a couple of gravediggers about to violate his grandfather Apollinaris’ grave, which had become unrecognizable over time. He instructs the addressee, his nephew Secundus, to restore the tomb mound and provide it with a stone for which he attaches the text. Whereas this letter is usually interpreted as a piece of self-promotion by the author for his filial piety and expert storytelling, this article suggests that there is (...) a significant subtext to be found in Lucan's Pharsalia which makes the letter first and foremost a rehabilitation of Apollinaris while strongly suggesting that the latter was executed. There follow some rather more tentative thoughts trying to grasp the precise critical moment in time for this rehabilitation. It is argued that this could be Sidonius’ departure for Clermont, in 469/470 to take on the episcopate, after his term as City Prefect of Rome and a stay in Lyons with Bishop Patiens. The letter is aimed at bolstering family cohesion in the conflict of interests between Auvergne and Provence and at securing Sidonius’ position as incumbent bishop. (shrink)

Begriffsschrift, a formula language, modeled upon that of arithmetic, for pure thought (1879), by G. Frege.--Some metamathematical results on completeness and consistency; On formally undecidable propositions of Principia mathematica and related systems I; and On completeness and consistency (1930b, 1931, and 1931a), by K. Gödel.--Bibliography (p. [111]-116).

This content analysis examines the ways that genocide is included in the high school world history content standards of eleven states with legislative mandates requiring genocide education, as well as if the content standards in those states differ from those of states without mandated genocide education. The null curriculum theorizes that the content that is not taught may be as important as what is taught; this lens allows for a nuanced analysis of the ways that genocide is included and excluded (...) in state standards. The findings suggest that states with legislative mandates requiring genocide education do not necessarily have high school world history content standards that require genocide education. The content standards in states with legislative mandates often omit acts of genocide, refrain from using the term “genocide,” and frame genocides as less important than the Holocaust, perpetuating the null curriculum of genocides. (shrink)

Ve svém článku ‘Je elementární logika totéž co predikátová logika prvního řádu?’ (Pokroky matematiky, fyziky a astronomie 42, 1997, 127-133) klade Jiří Fiala nesmírně zajímavou otázku, zda je opodstatněné ztotožňovat elementární logiku s predikátovou logikou prvního řádu; s pomocí argumentů propagovaných již delší dobu finským logikem a filosofem Jaako Hintikkou (viz již jeho Logic, Language-Games and Information, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973; nejnověji jeho The Principles of Mathematics Revisited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996) naznačuje, že by tomu tak být nemuselo. Myslím, (...) že uváděná argumentace stojí za bližší rozbor. Hintikka v podstatě říká: Kvantifikované formule predikátové logiky jsou svou podstatou o vybírání prvků z univerza; například ∀x∃yR(x,y) neříká nic jiného než to, že ke každému x můžeme vybrat y, které je k němu ve vztahu R. Obecněji říká Hintikka to, že každá formule je vlastně zápisem určité hry (ve smyslu matematické teorie her), jejíž některé tahy spočívají ve vybírání individuí. Na základě tohoto se pak ptá: je nějaký rozumný důvod, proč se omezovat jenom na hry toho typu, které jsou vyjádřitelné formulemi standardního predikátového počtu? Proč připouštět jen hry s úplnou informací (tj. ty, při kterých jsou při každém tahu k dispozici všechny tahy předchozí), proč vylučovat hry jiné; tudíž proč připouštět jen lineárně uspořádané kvantifikátory, a nepřipustit i kvantifikátory uspořádané třeba jen částečně? Hintikkova argumentace je příkladem argumentace typu formule logiky prvního řádu jsou ve skutečnosti o tom a o tom, tudíž ... . Uveďme pro ilustraci jiný nedávný příklad stejného argumentačního schématu, který pochází od Johana van Benthema (Exploring Logical Dynamics, CSLI, Stanford, 1997). Ten říká: Kvantifikátory jsou v podstatě modality, kvantifikované formule jsou tedy formule modální a jsou tudíž o existenci nějakých alternativ: formule ∀xP(x) říká, že P(x) je nutné, neboli že P(x) platí v každém „dosažitelném možném stavu věcí“, zatímco formule ∃xP(x) říká, že P(x) je možné, neboli že platí alespoň v jednom takovém stavu věcí.. (shrink)

De filosofie van Schopenhauer is nu van een verbijsterende actualiteit. Om weg te komen uit onze ondergangsstemming, waanzinnig politiek beleid en de 2030 Agenda biedt Schopenhauer een stevig handvat. De weg vooruit is de weg terug. Joris van Rossum is filosoof en Schopenhauer-expert."--Publisher information.

In "Off Track" art and philosophy are the inspiration to look differently at daily life and organizations. The book is a plea to approach the complexity of the current world with new metaphors. The author calls this "hinking around". She sees that in "square worlds" there is a need for tools to approach entrenched patterns and systems differently and to get thought processes moving. Sarai van de Boel challenges the reader to look at one's own systems from the inside with (...) a philosophical approach. In eight chapters there are eight "tracks" to follow, but it is also possible to go off the rails. More than fifty works of art by well-known and lesser-known artists and designers play a role in these traces. The author questions the essence of their works and asks philosophical questions about phenomena they evoke. With Marlene Dumas, Marinus Boezem, L.A. Raeven, Ed Atkins, Wong Ping, Kazumasa Nagai, Remy Jungerman, Otto Piene, Eiko Ishioka, Campana brothers, Ann Demeulemeester and Kara Walker. The book ends with the Art & Philosophy Strategy, a theoretical framework for the use of art and philosophy. (shrink)

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Nederlandse wijsbegeerte.--Fichte, Schelling, Hegel en hun kring.

In this book, Andreas Serafim sets out to investigate the use of religious discourse, by which he means any reference to religious ideas, beliefs, and attitudes in public speaking contexts in classical Athens. Like Gunther Martin (Divine Talk: Religious Argumentation in Demosthenes, 2009), Serafim examines religion primarily as a tool for persuasion, but he differentiates himself from Martin’s book by offering a more comprehensive study: he aims to take into account all extant speeches from t...